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Abstract. Despite the high stakes involved in smart contracts, they
are often developed in an undisciplined manner, leaving the security
and reliability of blockchain transactions at risk. In this paper, we intro-
duce ContraMaster — an oracle-supported dynamic exploit generation
framework for smart contracts. Existing approaches mutate only single
transactions; ContraMaster exceeds these by mutating the transaction
sequences. ContraMaster uses data-flow, control-flow, and the dynamic
contract state to guide its mutations. It then monitors the executions
of target contract programs, and validates the results against a general-
purpose semantic test oracle to discover vulnerabilities. Being a dynamic
technique, it guarantees that each discovered vulnerability is a violation
of the test oracle and is able to generate the attack script to exploit this
vulnerability. In contrast to rule-based approaches, ContraMaster has
not shown any false positives, and it easily generalizes to unknown types
of vulnerabilities (e.g., logic errors). We evaluate ContraMaster on 218
vulnerable smart contracts. The experimental results confirm its practical
applicability and advantages over the state-of-the-art techniques, and
also reveal three new types of attacks.
1 Introduction
Smart contracts are computer programs that execute on top of blockchains (e.g.,
Bitcoin [1] and Ethereum [2]) to manage the flow of funds, exchange of assets,
and transfer of digital rights between various parties [3,4]. Transactions within
smart contracts are stored persistently in the blockchain and thus immutable,
without requiring a central third party to validate them. Due to these unique
advantages, smart contracts have gained a lot of popularity and attraction in
recent years. Many believe that this technology has the potential to reshape
a number of industries, e.g., banking, insurance, supply chains, and financial
exchanges [5].
The role of smart contracts in managing shared assets (often cryptographic
currencies) requires a high level of security and reliability. Yet, an increasing
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number of high-profile attacks have occurred, resulting in great financial losses.
Such attacks are facilitated by the lack of a rigorous development and testing
process. One notorious example is the “DAO” attack, where attackers stole more
than 3.5 million Ether (equivalent to about $45 million USD at that time) from
“DAO” contract [6].
These incidents have spurred activities in detecting vulnerabilities in smart
contracts [6,7,8,9,10,11,12]. Existing techniques usually detect smart contract
vulnerabilities based on rule-based approaches: the contract behaviors are matched
to a limited set of vulnerability patterns identified beforehand. The precision
and recall of these techniques largely depend on the size and quality of their
collections of vulnerability patterns. Most such patterns are defined at the syntax
level such as particular statements/calls sequences, ignoring their actual effects on
contracts and resulting in false positives. For example, Zeus [11] treats the refund
function in DaoChallenge [13] contract (shown in Fig. 11) as vulnerable, because
it may potentially be reentered. However, such reentrancy behavior cannot be
exploited in stealing Ether from it, since the authors have incorporated defensive
mechanisms to prevent from transferring unauthorized Ether (c.f. Sect. 5.5).
Similar problems exist in how ContractFuzzer [8] detects exception disorder
(more details in Sect. 5.5).
To address above issues, we propose to dynamically execute transactions and
observe their actual effects on the contract states in order to detect exploitable
vulnerabilities. Our key insight is that almost all the existing (syntactical) vul-
nerability patterns result in a (semantic) mismatch between the externally visible
events (e. g., amount transferred and contract balance changed) and the internal
contract states (e. g., amount maintained in the contract’s internal bookkeeping)
in a transaction. As a result, the internal bookkeeping becomes inconsistent, indi-
cating a successful exploit. Based on this observation, we define a general-purpose
semantic test oracle, which can be used to detect such mismatches at runtime.
Our technique is dynamic and works on target contracts that run on a realistic
test environment. Thus, it does not suffer from the imprecision faced by most static
techniques. All the vulnerabilities detected by our approach can be successfully
reproduced. When generating attack inputs, we take into account the unique
characteristics of smart contracts which make traditional fuzzers ineffective. For
example, attackers need to synthesize a sequence of transactions to successfully
mount an attack (e.g., the transaction sequence “deposit → withdraw” is required
for the DAO attack) [14]. In contrast, traditional fuzzers such as AFL [15] focus
on vulnerabilities triggered by a single test case. We extend traditional grey-
box fuzzers with mutation operators customized for smart contracts, including
transaction sequences, gas limits, fallback functions, and contract states, apart
from function inputs. We also develop the novel feedback mechanisms to guide
the fuzzing process, by considering the data-flow and dynamic contract state
information, together with the control-flow information.
We implemented our approach in ContraMaster and evaluated it on 218
vulnerable smart contracts reported by ContractFuzzer [8] and Zeus [11]. We
found that, of these potentially vulnerable contracts, only 28 (12.84%) are
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exploitable, and the remaining (87.16%) are not. In addition, ContraMaster
detected 26 hitherto unknown vulnerabilities, which could not be detected using
previously identified vulnerability patterns.
In this paper, we make the following novel contributions:
– We design a general-purpose semantic oracle, which can be used to detect a
wide range of vulnerabilities, such as reentrancy, exception disorder, gasless
send and integer overflow/underflow.
– We develop an oracle-supported dynamic exploit generation framework for
smart contracts — ContraMaster. Specifically, we design customized mutation
operators and feedback mechanisms, which are shown useful at improving the
effectiveness of vulnerability detection.
– We evaluate ContraMaster on 218 smart contracts and demonstrate its advan-
tages in discovering exploitable vulnerabilities over state-of-the-art techniques.
Among the 218 vulnerabilities reported by the state-of-the-art techniques,
only 28 are exploitable, and ContraMaster detects all of them without false
positives.
– We present our findings on the 26 newly identified vulnerabilities, which cannot
be detected by previously identified vulnerability patterns.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Sect. 2 provides the necessary
background and definitions for the rest of the paper. Sect. 3 illustrates our se-
mantic test oracle. Sect. 4 introduces the technical details of our oracle-supported
fuzzing and automated exploit generation. Sect. 5 discusses challenges for im-
plementing ContraMaster and the evaluation results on real Ethereum smart
contracts. Finally, we discuss related work and conclude in Sect. 6 and Sect. 7,
respectively.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we provide the necessary background and definitions for the rest
of the paper.
2.1 Blockchain and Smart Contract
A blockchain is a shared, transparent distributed ledger, and is maintained by
a decentralized network of peers (miners) [16]. The miners perform the mining
process of adding a block and verifying the validity of transactions through a
proof-of-work (PoW) [17] or other consensus protocols, such as proof-of-stake
(PoS) [18]. Thus, a blockchain can be considered as an ever-growing list of blocks,
each encoding a sequence of transactions, always available for inspection and safe
from tampering. Each block contains a cryptographic signature of its previous
block. No previous block can be changed or rejected, unless 51% of miners are
controlled and all its successors are changed or rejected. With this structure,
blockchain achieves decentralization, traceability, transparency, and immutability.
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Fig. 1. Illustration of Ethereum smart contracts running on blockchains.
A smart contract is computer program which allows users to define and
execute transactions automatically on the blockchain [19]. A smart contract
resides at a specific address on the blockchain, providing a number of publicly
accessible functions and fields. Moreover, a special balance variable records the
cryptocurrencies owned by the contract address and cannot be freely altered
by programmers. When a function of the smart contract is invoked, the current
state of the contract is retrieved from the blockchain, and the updated state of
the contract is stored back on the blockchain after execution.
A transaction is carried out in the form of a message sent to a particular
address on the blockchain, which can either be a normal user account address or a
contract address. A user sends transactions to the blockchain in order to: (1) create
new contracts, (2) invoke a function of a contract, or (3) transfer cryptocurrencies
to contracts or other users. All the transactions sent by participants, called
external transactions, are recorded on the blockchain. Upon receiving an external
transaction, a contract can also trigger some internal transactions, which are
not explicitly recorded on the blockchain, but still have effects on the balance of
participants or contracts.
The Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) [2] is a stack-machine with an instruc-
tion set including standard arithmetic instructions, conditional and unconditional
jump instructions, basic cryptography primitives, and primitives for gas compu-
tation. The data is stored on the persistent memory area storage (a key-value
store that maps 256-bit words to 256-bit words), the contract-local memory (a
contract obtains a freshly cleared instance for each message call), or a stack
(since the EVM is not a register machine but a stack machine, all computations
are performed on the stack). When Ethereum smart contracts are compiled and
deployed, they are run on the EVM.
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Fig. 1 is a schematic representation of the Ethereum smart contracts running
on blockchains. When participants submit a transaction to the blockchain, they
may be mined by a miner m and executed on m’s EVM. When the transaction
is finished, the execution result is appended to the block list and propagated over
the blockchain network. At this point, other miners, such as m+ 1 may discover
the new block list and validate it. When majority of the miners validate the new
block list, it becomes the confirmed block list, and cannot be changed or rejected.
2.2 A Customized Semantic Model
Smart contracts are similar to general computer programs in the sense that they
are written in a Turing-complete language, e. g., Solidity [20]. Various formal
semantic models of Solidity have been proposed in previous work [11,21], to
enable formal verification of smart contracts. Since our goal in this paper is to
perform dynamic analysis for Solidity contracts and verify runtime contract states
against our test oracle, we propose a customized semantic model that is simple
but expressive enough to capture the transaction-related contract behaviors. We
define contract state and transaction as follows.
Definition 1 (Contract and Contract State). A contract can be abstracted
as a tuple C := 〈c, bal , A, σ〉, where c ∈ Addr is a unique address identifying the
contract, bal ∈ N is the externally visible balance of the contract, A ∈ 2Addr is a
set of account addresses of participants, and σ is the internal contract state. A
contract state σ is a type-consistent valuation of the global variables (V ).
The set of all states is denoted by Σ ∪ {Err}, where Err is a special state
indicating an error state. For a given state σ ∈ Σ and an expression e, eσ denotes
the evaluation of e in that state. The semantics of a contract program is a set
of execution traces, where a trace corresponds to a sequence of internal contract
states. In Ethereum, each contract also has an externally-visible contract balance
(bal) representing the total amount of funds in the contract, which is a part of
the blockchain state (as opposed to the contract state).
Definition 2 (Transaction). A transaction t := 〈s, r, v〉, if performed success-
fully, deducts amount v from the sending account’s balance (s.bal where s ∈ Addr)
and transfers the funds to a receiving account at address r ∈ Addr. We denote
the values of a variable g before and after the transaction as pre(g) and post(g),
respectively.
A transaction usually alters the blockchain state, reflected as updates on the
contract balance. In this case, the caller and callee contracts of a transaction
correspond to the sending and receiving accounts, respectively.
2.3 Threat Model
To study the potential vulnerabilities of smart contracts, an important guarantee
of a securely implemented contract is that it only allows authorized accounts to
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transfer the authorized amount of Ether [22]. For example, the DAO contract,
if implemented correctly, should only allow users to withdraw the amount of
Ether have been deposited previously. We assume that a regular user with no
special capabilities attempts to break through this guarantee. A smart contract
is vulnerable, if adversaries can bypass authorization and steal more Ether from
the contract than allowed, resulting in a loss for contract owner, or victims store
Ether in the contract but receive a lower level of authorization than intended,
resulting in a loss for the participants [22].
In this paper, we consider smart contracts which use internal bookkeeping
variables to honestly record the authorized amount for authorized participants.
This is common practice for contracts which manage shared funds. For example,
in the standard Ethereum contracts such as ERC-20 [23] and ERC-721 [24], the
function balanceOf returns the authorized amount for an authorized participant.
3 Semantic Test Oracle
The fundamental difficulty in detecting smart contract vulnerabilities is the lack
of a general-purpose test oracle. This is because smart contracts do not crash
like general computer programs, and their execution may be silently reverted
in cases of irregularities. To address this issue, we propose a test oracle which
detects irregularities in smart contracts at the semantic-level. Our semantic test
oracle implements two types of invariants that transactions must comply with.
3.1 Balance and Transaction Invariants
Smart contracts are mainly used to manage the transfer of assets and perform
bookkeeping [25], thus they need to keep track of participants’ individual account
balances, called the bookkeeping balances. Contract programs use an internal
bookkeeping variable (e. g., balances in Fig. 2) to record the bookkeeping balances.
Suppose a bookkeeping variable m : Addr 7→ N is given.
Definition 3 (Balance Invariant). For every contract 〈c, bal , A, σ〉,∑a∈Amσ(a)−
bal = K, where K is a constant.
The balance invariant requires that the difference between the contract balance
and the sum of all participants’ bookkeeping balances remains constant, before
and after a transaction. This invariant is defined within a single contract, i. e.,
intra-contract, and it ensures the integrity of the bookkeeping balances. If the
bookkeeping balances are not updated correctly within a transaction, then the
violation of this invariant indicates that an irregular event has happened. For
example, when an integer underflow happens during a transaction, the contract
balance naturally goes down while the bookkeeping balances go up instead.
Definition 4 (Transaction Invariant). For every outgoing transaction 〈c, r, v〉
where c is the sending contract’s address, ∆(mσ(r)) + ∆(r.bal) = 0, where
∆(x) = post(x)− pre(x).
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The transaction invariant requires that the amount deducted from a contract’s
bookkeeping balances is always deposited into the recipient’s balance. This inter-
contract invariant ensures the consistency between the both ends of a transaction.
Note that the consistency of incoming transactions can be guaranteed by the
balance invariant or other contract’s outgoing transaction invariant. In some
cases, a transaction in progress may fail and funds are not transferred. If the
failure is not be captured by the contract’s bookkeeping variables, the contract
may become vulnerable (e. g., exception disorder).
3.2 Runtime Invariant Checking
Since the invariants are supposed to hold for each transaction among contracts
involved, the test oracle can be implemented as a set of runtime checks before
and after each transaction. Notice that the runtime checks mentioned here are
on the transaction-level, in which multiple contracts are involved. Thus, adding
assertions in contracts does not work since assertions in each contract cannot
express inter-contract properties. The biggest challenge of implementing such
runtime checks is to automatically identify the bookkeeping variables.
Identification of Bookkeeping Variables. Most contracts performing mean-
ingful transactions among multiple participants contain a bookkeeping variable,
usually with the name balances or balanceOf. The bookkeeping variable has
a few characteristics distinguishing it from the others: (1) it is a mapping from
account addresses to unsigned integers, i.e., mapping(address => uint*) (there
are a few exceptions which are explained in Sect. 5); (2) it is at least updated once
in a payable function; and (3) in a normal transaction, the amount received from
an account address should be reflected as a balance increase for that address.
Based on these observations, we design an algorithm for the automatic
identification of bookkeeping variables. For every mapping variable updated in
payable functions, we send several transactions with randomly chosen values
(including extremely large and small amounts). We then observe the increased
amount at the sender’s address. If the increases always match with the amounts
being sent, we record the variable as a bookkeeping variable.
The bookkeeping variables in some contracts may not refer to the amount of
Ether. This is often the case in ERC-20 and ERC-721 contracts [23]. In these con-
tracts, participants’ digital assets are reflected in terms of the number of available
tokens rather than Ether. In such cases, standard APIs for getting individual
account balances (balanceOf) and total contract balances (totalSupply) in
terms of tokens are provided and can be directly used to implement the runtime
checks.
3.3 Detecting Vulnerabilities with the Test Oracle
Now we discuss how previously reported vulnerabilities [7,10,26,16] can be de-
tected by our test oracle [27].
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1 contract SimpleDAO {
2 mapping (address => unit) public balances;
3 function donate(address to) {
4 balances[to] += msg.value;
5 }
6 function withdraw(uint amount) {
7 require(balances[msg.sender] >= amount);
8 msg.sender.call.value(amount)(); // E x c e p t i o n D i s o r d e r
9 balances[msg.sender] -= amount;
10 }
11 function another_withdraw(uint amount) {
12 require(balances[msg.sender] >= amount);
13 msg.sender.send(amount)(); // G a s l e s s S e n d
14 balances[msg.sender] -= amount;
15 }
16 }
Fig. 2. A simple contract susceptible to the “DAO” attack.
1 contract attackDAO {
2 SimpleDAO public dao;
3 constructor(address _dao){
4 dao = SimpleDAO(_dao);
5 }
6 function donate(address to){
7 dao.donate.value(msg.value)(to);
8 }
9 function withdraw(uint amount){
10 dao.withdraw(amount);
11 }
12 ......
13 function () public payable {
14 dao.withdraw(...); // R e e n t r a n c y
15 }
16 }
Fig. 3. Reentrancy attack on the simple “DAO” contract.
Reentrancy. Programmers often believe that, when a non-recursive function
is invoked, it cannot be re-entered before its termination. However, this is not
always the case, due to the fallback function introduced by Solidity. Take the
simplified “DAO” attack for example. Two contracts, SimpleDAO (the victim, in
Fig. 2) and attackDAO (in Fig. 3), are deployed on the blockchain. The reentrancy
vulnerability of SimpleDAO can be exploited by attackDAO. When attackDAO
withdraws from SimpleDAO via Line 10 of Fig. 3, it will execute Lines 7–8 of
Fig. 2. Then, due to fallback function mechanism, Line 8 of Fig. 2 executes Line
14 of Fig. 3, which further executes Lines 7–8 of Fig. 2 again and thus generate
recursive calls. Notice that, the execution of Line 9 of Fig. 2 is delayed.
The consequence of reentrancy is that Line 9 of Fig. 2 may be executed more
times than allowed, and it leads to the integer underflow of bookkeeping variable
balances. The underflow will produce the incorrect values for balances, which
violates the balance invariant (Definition 3).
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1 contract another_attackDAO {
2 ......
3 function () public payable {
4 throw; // N o r e e n t r a n c y
5 }
6 }
Fig. 4. Exception disorder example.
1 contract UnderflowAttack {
2 ...
3 function withdraw(uint amount) public {
4 require(balances[msg.sender] - amount > 0);
5 msg.sender.transfer(amount);
6 balances[msg.sender] -= amount; // U n d e r f l o w
7 }
8 ...
9 }
Fig. 5. The underflow attack example [28].
Exception Disorder. Solidity is not uniform in handling exceptions. Within a
chain of nested calls, there are two types of exception handling mechanisms [26]:
(1) If a function in the chain is a call (the same for delegatecall and send),
the exception is propagated along the chain, reverting all side effects, until it
reaches the call. From that point on, the execution is resumed with the call
returning false. (2) If all the functions in the chain are direct calls (not via call,
delegatecall and send), the execution stops and all side effects are reverted,
including the transfers of Ether.
Developers may handle exceptions incorrectly. For example, Line 8 of Fig. 2
tries to transfer Ether to account msg.sender. If this account is a contract, this
transfer may fail, resulting in an exception. Since this exception is not properly
handled, the balance of this account (balances[msg.sender]) is decreased but it
does not actually receive Ether. Thus, this transaction will violate the transaction
invariant (Definition 4).
Gasless Send. Gasless send is a special case of exception disorder. When
transferring Ether from one contract to another with function send, it may lead
to an out-of-gas exception. The default gas limit for function send is 2,300 Wei. If
the recipient’s fallback function contains too many instructions, it may lead to an
out-of-gas exception for function send, resulting in a gasless send. For example,
at Line 13 of Fig. 2 the attacker (whose address is msg.sender) may have an
expensive fallback function and the send function may fail. Since gasless send is
a special case of exception disorder, it can also be detected by the transaction
invariant (Definition 4).
Integer Over/Under-flow. Smart contracts heavily use integer arithmetic
operations to manipulate participants’ balances. However, these variables are
10 Haijun Wang, Yi Li, Shang-Wei Lin, Cyrille Artho, Lei Ma, and Yang Liu
 Sequence
Pool
Initial 
Seeds
Execution Oracle
Exploit Report
Failed
Smart 
Contract
Passed
Mutation
Function 
Inputs
Fallback 
FunctionGas Limit
Transaction 
Sequence
Contract 
State
Control Flow 
Graph Information
Data Flow
Graph Information
Dynamic Dictionary 
Information
Feedback Information
Instrumented EVM
New Transaction 
Sequences
Transaction 
Sequence Synthesis 
Fig. 6. Overview of the ContraMaster.
susceptible to integer over/under-flow, e.g., in Fig. 5, balances[msg.sender]
and amount are both unsigned integers. If balances[msg.sender] is less than
amount, the check at Line 4 will pass due to integer underflow, leading to another
underflow at Line 6. This produces the wrong value for the bookkeeping variable,
which violates the balance invariant (Definition 3).
Other Vulnerabilities. There are a few other types of vulnerabilities, including
the timestamp dependency, block number dependency and freezing ether [26].
Exploiting vulnerabilities such as timestamp and block number dependencies
requires the cooperation of miners, therefore cannot be easily realized at the
contract-level. In model checking [29] terms, freezing ether is an violation of
the liveness property, while our dynamic approach can only detect violations of
safety properties. ContraMaster mainly focuses on detecting reentrancy, exception
disorder, gasless send, integer over/under-flow, and potentially other types of
vulnerabilities triggered during transactions.
4 Oracle-Supported Fuzzing
Fig. 6 shows the overview of ContraMaster, which is driven by a grey-box fuzzing
loop [15,30]. Given a set of initial seeds, ContraMaster randomly synthesizes a
set of transaction sequences and picks one from the pool in each iteration of the
fuzzing loop. ContraMaster runs each transaction in sequence on an instrumented
EVM. When the transaction is finished, ContraMaster verifies the contract state
against our semantic test oracle (details in Sect. 3). If a violation is detected,
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ContraMaster reports a vulnerability and presents the generated attack contract
and transaction sequence which can be used to reproduce the exploit. Otherwise,
ContraMaster collects runtime execution information to guide the test sequence
generation for the next iteration. The information collected mainly includes
control-, data-flow graph and contract state information.
Furthermore, ContraMaster is equipped with a number of new mutation
operators customized for smart contracts (c. f. Sect. 4.1). In addition to function
inputs used in traditional fuzzers, we also use gas limits, fallback functions, trans-
action sequences and contract states as the mutation targets. Many vulnerabilities
in smart contracts require the interplay of several contracts and can only be
exploited by a particular transaction sequence with the correct gas limit [31].
Therefore, the customized mutation operators are important for triggering vul-
nerabilities. The newly generated inputs are added to the pool and the fuzzing
process continues until it exceeds the allocated resource limits.
4.1 Oracle-Supported Fuzzing Algorithm
The goal of the fuzzing component is to automatically generate transaction
sequences that violate the test oracle. Algorithm 1 presents its high-level idea.
Given a contract program C and a set of initial seeds T , it first generates a set of
initial transaction sequences TS from T (Line 1). In every iteration of the fuzzing
loop (Lines 2–22), we select a transaction sequence ts from TS (Line 3), and
initializes the current execution trace sequence (E) and contract state dictionary
(dict) as empty (Line 4). ContraMaster then executes each transaction ti ∈ ts
(Lines 5–10), and collects its execution trace ei (Line 6). It would also stores
observed contract states (e.g., the values of bookkeeping variables and contract
balances) into dictionary (Line 7), similar to what is done in traditional fuzzers
such as VUzzer [32]. The dictionary values are later used in generating function
inputs. The execution trace of each transaction ei is concatenated to form a
transaction sequence trace E (Line 8). After that, ContraMaster checks whether
the test oracle is violated. If so, it adds the current transaction sequence ts into
the output TS ′, which is a script exploiting the vulnerability (Line 10).
ContraMaster performs mutations at both the level of single transaction
(Lines 11–18), and at the level of transaction sequences (Lines 19–22). If ti
achieves new branch coverage, we perform mutations on the function inputs
and gas limit (Lines 13–14). When fallback function is called in the transaction,
we also perform mutations on fallback functions at Line 17. If the transaction
sequence’s trace E has new data dependence coverage, we perform transaction
sequence mutation (e.g., switching the order of transactions) at Line 20. In
the end, we randomly reset the whole smart contract states by contract state
mutation at Line 22. More details about each mutation strategy are given in
Sect. 4.2.
The highlighted code in Algorithm 1 shows the differences of ContraMaster
from traditional grey-box fuzzing approaches such as AFL [15]. To summarize,
traditional fuzzing techniques work on a single call, while ContraMaster works
on a transaction sequence. The reason is that a lot of vulnerabilities can only be
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Algorithm 1: Oracle-Supported Fuzzing
input : a contract program C, a set of initial seeds T
output : transaction sequences TS ′ violating the test oracle
1 TS ← generate initial transaction sequences from T ;
2 while time budget not reached and abort signal not received do
3 ts ← selectNext(TS) ;
4 E, dict← ∅, ∅ ;
5 foreach transaction ti in ts do
6 run ti and collect execution trace ei on EVM ;
7 dict← extractValues(ei) (store dictionary values) ;
8 E ← E, ei (append ei to E) ;
9 if test oracle is violated then
10 TS ′ ← TS ′ ∪ ts ;
11 foreach transaction ti in ts do
12 if ti has new branch coverage in ei then
13 TS i ← InputMutate(ti, dict) ;
14 TSg ← GasMutate(ti) ;
15 TS ← TS ∪ TS i ∪ TSg ;
16 if ti executes fallback function then
17 TSf ← FallbackMutate(ti) ;
18 TS ← TS ∪ TSf ;
19 if E has new data dependence coverage then
20 TS t ← TransSeqenceMutate(ts, E, dict) ;
21 TS ← TS ∪ TS t ;
22 ContractStateMutate() ;
triggered by a sequence of transactions. To effectively generate such sequences,
we use data-flow information to guide its mutation, which cannot be achieved
by control-flow information. Another important difference is that ContraMaster
performs mutations on fallback functions, through which the attack contracts
may interact with the target contract.
4.2 Mutation Strategies
In this section, we present our five mutation strategies, namely, the mutation of
function inputs, gas limit, fallback function, transaction sequence, and contract
state.
Attack Contract. ContraMaster uses the attack contracts to interact with
target contract, thus we first automatically generate the attack contract, like in
the example shown in Fig. 3. To synthesize the attack contracts, we use a variable
to represent the target contract and initialize it in the constructor function
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(lines 2–5). Then, for each function in target contract, ContraMaster develops a
surrogate function to call this function, as shown in lines 5–11 in Fig. 3. Finally,
we synthesize the fallback function as shown in lines 12–14.
Function Inputs. Line 13 of Algorithm 1 mutates the parameters passed to
each target function. We consider two types of function parameters: primitive
and array types.
Primitive-type parameters include Booleans (bool), account addresses, un-
signed integers (uint*), integers (int*), and arbitrary-length raw byte data
(byte*). First, we pick special values from the dynamic dictionary of previously
seen state variable values with matching types to generate multiple mutation
ranges. Within these ranges, we randomly generate values as candidate function
inputs. Second, we opportunistically negate bits in these inputs to produce new
inputs (similar to the “flip1” operation used in AFL [15]). For account addresses,
we simply enumerate addresses from a predefined account list. In most cases,
the collected dynamic dictionary and “flip1” are enough for generating effective
inputs, since most smart contracts have relatively simple program logic.
For array types, we consider both fixed- and arbitrary-length arrays. For
fixed-length arrays of primitive-type elements (e. g., address[n] and uint*[n]),
we use the same technique described above to generate random values for each
element. For an arbitrary-length array, we first generate a positive random number
as the array length, and then proceed as dealing with a fixed-length array. For
arbitrary-length bytes or strings, we use values from the dictionary and mutate
them with bit flips.
Gas Limit. Every instruction executed on EVM has an associated fee, known
as the gas. If the gas cost of a transaction exceeds the gas limit, an out-of-gas
exception is thrown. To simulate all possible behaviors with the exceptions
thrown in the middle of a transaction, we mutate on the gas limits at Line 14 of
Algorithm 1. First, we estimate the maximum gas cost Gt and the intrinsic gas
cost Gi [33] (consisting of a constant transaction fee and a data-dependent fee)
for a target transaction. Then, we divide the range between Gi and Gt into n
equal intervals and randomly choose a gas limit from each interval to initiate the
transaction with.
Fallback Function. The fallback function is an important mechanism in Ethereum
and is highly relevant to the reentrancy and exception disorder vulnerabilities.
When receiving funds from the target contract under test, the attacker’s con-
tract may use specially crafted fallback function to perform malicious activities.
To trigger these behaviors, ContraMaster performs mutations on the fallback
function at Line 17 of Algorithm 1.
We generate multiple attack contracts with different fallback functions to
interact with the target contract, such as in Figs. 3 and 4. In particular, we allow
any function of the target contract to be called within the attacker’s fallback
function. Apart from that, we also have an empty fallback function and one that
contains a single throw statement (e.g., revert()) to trigger exception disorders.
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Transaction Sequence. Some vulnerabilities can only be triggered with the
correct transaction sequences. For example, the DAO attack can only be mounted
by first depositing into the target contract and then withdrawing from it. To
find a successful exploit, we mutate the call sequences as follows. For a given
candidate transaction sequence, (1) if two transactions of a sequence operate on
the same contract state variable, we switch their order; (2) we randomly select a
transaction in the sequence, and replace it with a random new transaction; (3)
we randomly select a transaction in the sequence, and delete it; (4) we randomly
select a transaction in the sequence, and insert a random new transaction before
it.
Contract State. The effects of a transaction depend on the contract state in
which it is initiated. To mutate contract states, we allow the values of state
variables to be carried forward across multiple test runs and reset the state
periodically, say, after every n transactions. The reset of contract state is achieved
by redeploying the contract code to the private test network.
4.3 Feedback Mechanisms
The feedback used by ContraMaster can be broadly categorized into the control-
driven and data-driven, and contract state feedback information. The control-
driven feedback mechanism strives to cover more CFG edges as with AFL [15],
by favoring uncovered CFG edges.
Data-Driven Feedback. Since smart contract is state-relevant, we should
synthesize a suitable transaction sequence to detect the vulnerabilities. However,
the transaction sequence cannot be guided by the control-flow information, as a
different transaction sequence does not necessarily cover new CFG edges. Thus,
we propose to use data flow to guide transaction sequence mutations. If the
mutated transaction sequence covers new data dependencies, it is an interesting
transaction sequence. We first define the data dependency as follows.
Definition 5 (Data Dependency [34,35]). There is a data dependency from
y to x if there exists a directed path p from x to y where x defines a variable
v ∈ V , y uses v and there is no node z ∈ p that redefines v.
In the execution of transaction sequence, if two transactions operate on the
same contract state variable, we switch their order to generate new transaction
sequence. For example, the transaction sequence “withdraw → deposit” both
operate on the bookkeeping variable balances, thus we switch their order to
generate a new transaction sequence “deposit → withdraw”, which may trigger
the reentrancy vulnerability.
Contract State Feedback. Apart from the data dependency, we also use
the contract states (Definition 1) to guide the function input generation. The
basic idea is that, in most cases, the execution of current transaction heavily
depends on the contracts’ states. For example, the sequence “deposit → withdraw”
may trigger the reentrancy, but it depends on whether the funds deposited is
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greater than the funds withdrawn. Thus, we use contract states to guide function
input generation, such that the less funds withdrawn than those deposited. to
subsequently trigger potential vulnerabilities. In fact, we extract the dynamic
contract states as a dynamic dictionary, which is similar to VUzzer [32]. However,
the latter uses the immediate values in the code as the static dictionary.
4.4 ContraMaster by Example
Take the DAO contract in Fig. 2 as an example. Based on the initial seeds
{withdraw(10), deposit.value(5)(*)}, ContraMaster randomly synthesizes a trans-
action sequence, “ts1 = withdraw(10) → deposit.value(5)(*)”. After ts1 is exe-
cuted, we identify a data dependency between withdraw and deposit over the state
variable balances by analyzing the data flow of the execution trace. Using this as
feedback, we mutate ts1 and generate “ts2 = deposit.value(5)(*)→ withdraw(10)”.
In ts2’s execution, we assume it does not produce the reentrancy, because the
value withdrawn is greater than deposited. In addition, ContraMaster extracts
the contract states as the dynamic dictionary, e.g., the amount deposited into
balances is 5. Next, ContraMaster randomly generates three group of inputs (≤ 5,
5, and ≥ 5) as the parameters of withdraw, e.g., we get “ts3 = deposit.value(5)(*)
→ withdraw(3)”. At present, we still assume the reentrancy does not happen,
because the attack contract may not contain the right fallback function, e.g.,
another attackDAO in Fig. 4. Since ContraMaster also performs mutation on
fallback functions, and thus may generate new fallback functions, as attackDAO
in Fig. 3. Finally, we have attackDAO in Fig. 3, as attack contract, and execute
“deposit.value(5)(*) → withdraw(3)”, which triggers reentrancy.
When reentrancy occurs, Ether would be transferred to the attacker’s account
via the withdraw function. At last, the update of balances at Line 9 would produce
the underflow of balances. Since the value of bookkeeping variable balances is
wrong, and thus the balance invariant (Definition 3) is violated.
5 Implementation and Evaluation
In this section, we discuss the implementation of ContraMaster and evaluate it
on a set of benchmarks.
5.1 Implementation
We use go-ethereum 1.8.20 to build a private Ethereum blockchain as the test
network, and Truffle Suite 4.1.14 as the test harness. ContraMaster consists of
a front-end, which generates inputs and triggers transactions, and a back-end,
which executes the smart contracts and validates its behavior.
The front-end triggers transactions and performs mutations based on feedback
from earlier test runs. In the back-end, the stock EVM is modified to monitor
the runtime execution: the test oracle is enforced by asserting invariants after
each transaction is finished. If an invariant violation happens, the test sequence
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is reported as an exploit. Otherwise, it performs data-flow, control-flow, and
contract-state analysis to provide feedback to the front-end, which continues to
generate new test inputs. In total, ContraMaster is implemented with more than
5,000 lines of Javascript, Python and Go languages.
5.2 Evaluation
Our empirical evaluation of ContraMaster tries to answer the following research
questions:
– RQ1: How does ContraMaster perform compared to the state-of-the-art
pattern-based approaches?
– RQ2: How effective is the feedback-guided test generation in speeding up the
exploit generation?
– RQ3: Can ContraMaster discover previously unknown vulnerabilities?
Setup. All our experiments were performed on a 64-bit Ubuntu 18.04 desktop
with an Intel Xeon CPU E5-1650 (3.60 GHz, 12 cores) and 16 GB of RAM.
Since we focus on smart contract vulnerabilities, not the consensus protocol, we
configure only one peer node for the mining process. We set the initial mining
difficulty of the genesis block to 1 so that transaction confirmation is fast. We
also assume that each participant owns as much Ether as the total Ether supply
at the time of writing (currently about 108 Ether).
Subjects. To evaluate our approach, we selected the experimental subjects as
follows. We compared ContraMaster with ContractFuzzer [8], which is currently
the only other dynamic fuzzing tool, and the static verification tool Zeus [11].
These two tools reflect the state of the art in dynamic and static smart-contract
analysis, and use properties that are stronger than our test oracle. Thus, we
use the reported vulnerabilities as our experimental subjects (except timestamp
dependency, block number dependency, and dangerous delegatecall, which cannot
be easily exploited).
First, we included all the 188 contracts reported as vulnerable by Con-
tractFuzzer into our benchmark. Since ContractFuzzer does not analyze integer
overflow/underflow [8], we augment the set of benchmarks with 30 contracts
containing overflow/underflow vulnerabilities. These 30 contracts were randomly
selected from a set of 1,095 smart contracts that reported by Zeus [11] to have
this vulnerability. In total, we selected 218 smart contracts for our experiments,
among which there are only 33 (15%) contracts whose bookkeeping variables
cannot be automatically identified. We have manually investigated these con-
tracts and found that they use complicated data structures such as structures
or user-defined types to record the bookkeeping. Our simple heuristic is able to
automatically identify bookkeeping variables for 85% of the contracts.
5.3 Comparison with the State-of-the-Art
RQ 1 and RQ 3 relate to the effectiveness of ContraMaster. To evaluate this,
we compared ContraMaster with ContractFuzzer and Zeus. Table 1 shows the
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Table 1. Vulnerabilities reported by ContractFuzzer, Zeus and ContraMaster.
Vulnerability Types
Pattern-based Detection
ContraMaster
#Vul #Exp (%)
Reentrancy 14 6 42.86 % 6
Exception Disorder 36 13 36.11 % 13
Gasless Send 138 6 4.34 % 6
Integer Over/Under-flow 30 3 10.00 % 3
New Vulnerabilities — — — 26
Total/Avg. 218 28 12.84 % 54
vulnerability type, the number of reported vulnerabilities, the number of actually
exploitable vulnerabilities, and the percentage of exploitable vulnerabilities over
the vulnerabilities reported by the state of the art. The last column lists the
exploitable vulnerabilities reported by ContraMaster. Row “New Vulnerabilities”
shows the new vulnerabilities ContraMaster found; these are different from the
vulnerability types covered by the state-of-the-art ContractFuzzer and Zeus.
ContractFuzzer reports 14 reentrancy vulnerabilities. Out of these, only 6 con-
tracts were reported exploitable by ContraMaster. For the 8 smart contracts not
reported by ContraMaster, we manually checked the contract code and confirmed
that they are non-exploitable. Our investigation showed that ContractFuzzer
over-reports reentrancy vulnerabilities (around 42.86 % exploitable) because its
oracle is defined at the syntactic level.
For the exception disorder, ContractFuzzer reported 36 vulnerabilities, while
ContraMaster only reported 13. ContractFuzzer only considers a transaction
being safe if the exceptional case is followed by a throw statement. However, an
exception can be handled by multiple ways, e. g., reverting the modified variables,
in which the exception would not lead to an exploitable vulnerability.
ContractFuzzer also reports 138 gasless send vulnerabilities. However, the
gasless send vulnerabilities are not exploitable if the transfer() function is
used to send Ether, because the transfer() function automatically reverts
the program state if there is not enough gas. These cases were reported by
ContractFuzzer as vulnerable. Out of the 138 gasless send vulnerabilities, only 6
were reported exploitable by ContraMaster (4.34 %).
Integer overflow/underflows constitute another important issue in smart con-
tracts. Zeus detects integer overflow/underflow based on the predefined syntactic
patterns [36]. However, whether these really happen depends on the execution
environment and program contexts. In the 30 sampled integer overflow/underflow
vulnerabilities, only 3 were reported exploitable by ContraMaster (10.00 %).
Summary. In the 218 detected vulnerabilities by ContractFuzzer and Zeus, only
28 vulnerabilities were reported exploitable by ContraMaster (12.84%). For the
non-exploitable vulnerabilities, we manually checked and confirmed that they are
indeed not exploitable. Furthermore, ContraMaster finds 26 new vulnerabilities,
which are different from the vulnerability types in ContractFuzzer and Zeus.
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From the above experiments, we observe that ContraMaster only reports
exploitable vulnerabilities because its oracle is defined at the semantic level. In
addition to that, ContraMaster is able to discover previously unknown vulnera-
bilities. Two of the authors have independently verified the results by replaying
the exploit scripts manually. The authors of ContractFuzzer also confirmed our
findings. Later, in Section ??, we explain why some vulnerabilities reported by
ContractFuzzer and Zeus are not exploitable, and illustrate the new attacks.
5.4 Evaluation of Effectiveness
RQ 2 questions the effectiveness of feedback in fuzzing. To answer this question,
we implemented a variant of ContraMaster (called ContraAFL), which only uses
the control-flow information to guide the fuzzing process, similar to AFL. Then,
we performed the experiments on the 23 exploitable examples (5 exploitable
vulnerabilities are repetitive in exception disorder and gasless send) by repeating
each experiment 8 times, and the compared the performance of ContraMaster
and ContraAFL. We set a timeout of 600 seconds for each benchmark program,
in which ContraMaster can successfully finish all experiments.
Fig. 7 shows the comparison results, where the x and y axes show the time
taken by ContraMaster and ContraAFL, respectively. ContraMaster performs
better than ContraAFL for points above the diagonal line, which was observed
for all examples we ran. From the results, we can see that ContraMaster is highly
efficient, compared with ContraAFL, in recognizing exploitable vulnerabilities.
Specially, 3 exploitable vulnerabilities cannot be found by ContraAFL in the
given timeout (points lying on the top x-axis) in their all experiments.
Furthermore, a manual investigation revealed that the test sequences generated
by ContraAFL are mostly meaningless. For example, ContraAFL often chooses
amounts of Ether to send that are larger than the amount it owns. Thus, the
transaction would be reverted, resulting in no actual effect on the smart contracts.
On the other hand, ContraMaster is guided by feedback and gradually generates
meaningful transactions.
Mann Whitney U-test Scoring. Following Klees et al.’s [37] recommendation,
we apply the Mann Whitney U-test on the time used to find the vulnerabilities. As
shown in Tab. 2, in most experiments, the p-values are smaller than or close to a
significance level of 0.05. Thus, we conclude there exists a statistically significant
difference in the time used to find the vulnerabilities, compared to ContraAFL.
Vargha and Delaney Â12 Scoring. To determine the extent to which Contra-
Master outperforms ContraAFL, we also use Vargha and Delaney’s Â12 statistical
test [37]. From Tab. 2, we can see among benchmark experiments the resulting
Â12 statistic exceeds the conventionally large effect size of 0.71 in 18 out of 23
cases (78.3 %). Therefore, we conclude that the time usage in ContraMaster to
find vulnerabilities is statistically different from that in ContraAFL.
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Fig. 7. Time taken by ContraMaster and ContraAFL.
5.5 Case Studies
In this section, we report on interesting findings from our case studies. Sect. 5.5
introduces some new attacks found by ContraMaster in the experiments, and
Sect. 5.5 investigates on some non-exploitable vulnerabilities reported by Con-
tractFuzzer [8], Zeus [11], and Oyente [9].
New Attack Surfaces There are three different types of new attacks found by
ContraMaster in 26 smart contracts.
Incorrect Access Control. Access control is important in smart contracts,
which allows critical operations to be performed only by the owner of the con-
tract. Access control-related issues are ranked the second most severe among all
vulnerability types [38]. It is very hard to define a pattern/property to capture
all incorrect access controls, unlike for other vulnerabilities, e.g., reentrancy.
However, when incorrect access control is exploited, our approach is able to
detect it based on its detrimental effects.
A code snippet from the smart contract CreditDepositBank (in Fig. 8) is
vulnerable and was detected by our approach. The contract CreditDepositBank
has a public function takeOver(), which can transfer ownership to the sender of
the message. A sender who acquires the ownership can then call the withdraw()
function to withdraw Ether of any other participant. Furthermore, the book-
keeping variable “balances” is not updated after the “send” (Line 10), thus
violating the balance invariant.
20 Haijun Wang, Yi Li, Shang-Wei Lin, Cyrille Artho, Lei Ma, and Yang Liu
Table 2. Statistical results for feedback-directed fuzzing.
Contracts
ContraMaster (s) ContraAFL (s) Statistics
Avg. Variance Avg. Var p-value Â12
BountyHunt 25 137 214 62081 0.0043 0.898
Eth VAULT 46 2148 399 57003 0.0035 0.906
PIGGY BANK 98 5940 339 79022 0.0625 0.734
Private accumulation fund 124 12614 463 64123 0.0135 0.828
Private Bank 76 3412 534 34848 0.0013 0.937
PrivateDeposit 156 8555 600 0 0.0002 1.000
EthSplit 21 14 23 45 0.3952 0.547
FreeEth 38 718 164 25189 0.0010 0.968
HelpMeSave 50 1253 116 9234 0.0328 0.781
HFConditionalTransfer 12 9 15 10 0.0755 0.719
Honey 44 524 104 10249 0.0704 0.727
MultipicatorX4 35 401 86 3659 0.0091 0.859
Pie 53 1224 133 5455 0.0203 0.813
TokenBank 131 1066 600 0 0.0002 1.000
transferIntwopart 23 49 27 119 0.2468 0.609
WahleGIveaway 49 1153 162 26793 0.0781 0.718
CreditDepositBank 106 4070 436 40511 0.0009 0.968
SafeConditionalHFTransfer 25 37 30 75 0.1465 0.664
Soleau 24 75 30 101 0.1125 0.688
Etheramid 23 27 28 26793 0.0940 0.703
SImpleLotto 132 879 193 2896 0.0157 0.828
MyToken 116 651 240 25187 0.0023 0.929
SimpleCoinFlipGame 58 90 600 0 0.0002 1.000
Avg. 63.58 1958.62 240.60 20582.36 — —
Honey Trap. Some contracts, e.g, ETH VAULT and WhaleGiveaway, contain
honey traps where the participants deposit Ether into the contracts, and cannot
withdraw it again. These smart contracts are unfair to the participants. We take
the code snippet from ETH VAULT in Fig. 9 to illustrate its mechanism.
The contract has a minimum deposit value, which is set by the owner of
contract. When the participant deposits less Ether than the minimum value
by invoking the payable function “deposit” (false branch at Line 3 in Fig. 9),
the Ether is still deposited into the contract without any record. Therefore, the
participant cannot withdraw his contribution again, The transaction reduces the
balance of participant without changing the bookkeeping variable. This violates
the transaction invariant. The expected behavior should be to return the fund to
the participant and roll back the transaction, if the contribution is less than the
minimum requirement.
Deposit Less and Withdraw More. Some smart contracts, e.g., BountyHunt,
LZLCoin and PowerCoin, are vulnerable by allowing an adversary to withdraw
more Ether than they have deposited.
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1 contract CreditDepositBank is Ownable {
2 function takeOver() public {
3 if (balances[msg.sender] > 0) {
4 owner = msg.sender;
5 }
6 }
7 ...
8 function withdraw(address client) public onlyOwner {
9 require (balances[client] > 0);
10 msg.sender.send(balances[client]);
11 }
12 }
Fig. 8. A vulnerability due to incorrect access control.
1 contract ETH_VAULT {
2 function deposit() public payable {
3 if (msg.value > MinDeposit) {
4 balance[msg.sender] += msg.value;
5 TransferLog.addMessage(msg.sender, msg.value,
'Deposit');↪→
6 }
7 }
8 ...
9 }
Fig. 9. A honey trap example.
A code snippet from LZLCoin (Fig. 10) illustrates this vulnerability. The
vulnerable function takes two parameters tkA and etA, which represent the
balance a participant is able to withdraw and the Ether actually being sent
out, respectively. The values of these two parameters should always be equal,
otherwise, the adversary is able to choose a smaller value for tkA and a larger
value for etA, to withdraw more than pledged. This behavior violates our balance
invariant.
Non-Exploitable Vulnerabilities Reported by the Pattern-Based Ap-
proaches In this section, we illustrate the reasons why some vulnerabilities
detected by existing techniques are not exploitable.
Reentrancy. Reentrancy describes the situation where a function is re-entered
while in the midst of its execution. Reentrancy has become notorious due to the
DAO bug [6], and is considered as the top vulnerability [38]. Based on predefined
properties, existing techniques, e. g., Zeus, can detect reentrancy. However, these
properties, based on fixed patterns, are so strong that non-exploitable renentrancy
is also reported. For example, the contract DaoChallenge shown in Fig. 11 was
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1 contract LZLCoin is Ownable, StandardToken {
2 function eT(address _pd, uint _tkA, uint _etA) returns
(bool) {↪→
3 balances[msg.sender] = safeSub(balances[msg.sender],
_tkA);↪→
4 balances[_pd] = safeAdd(balances[_pd], _tkA);
5 if (!_pd.call.value(_etA)()) revert();
6 ET(_pd, tkA, _etA);
7 return true;
8 }
9 ...
10 }
Fig. 10. An example for deposit less and withdraw more.
reported by Zeus as vulnerable [11]. However, based on the official website [39]
where the contract was originally from, this is not an exploitable reentrancy.
This contract first checks whether the balance of the message sender is
zero at Line 11. If so, it throws an exception and reverts the program state.
Otherwise, it sets the balance of the sender to zero at Line 12, and then uses
withdrawEtherOrThrow(), the safe withdraw function, to fetch Ether at Line
13. Through this safe withdraw function, the program may re-enter the function
refund(). When reentering function refund(), the balance will be set to zero.
Thus, the reentrancy cannot pass the check at Line 11 again, and the program
state is reverted. As a result, an adversary cannot steal Ether from this contract.
Although ContractFuzzer adds extra conditions (e.g., a call() invocation
has a greater-than-zero value) to reduce false positives, it still reports non-
exploitable reentrancy cases. This is because the extra conditions are only based
on syntax without considering the semantics. For example, the code snippet from
FunFairSale (Fig. 12) is a non-exploitable reentrancy detected by ContractFuzzer.
At Line 4, the owner of the contract may withdraw all the balance. Even if the
withdraw() function is reentered, its program state is reverted due to not having
enough funds to withdraw.
Exception Disorder. An exception disorder occurs where there are inconsisten-
cies in exception handling. These inconsistencies are very hard to detect in smart
contracts. ContractFuzzer uses a pattern to detect exception disorders: it checks
if a throw statement is executed after a failed send(), in order to revert the
transaction [8]. Zeus [11] checks whether there is a write operation on a global
variable after a failed send(). However, both checks are purely syntactic, and
many non-exploitable vulnerabilities are reported because of this.
For example, consider the code snippet from Store in Fig. 13. At Line 5, the
contract pays out Ether to the message sender and the send() operation may
fail. When the send() operation fails, the contract reverts the program states
at Line 8. This is in fact a correct way to handle the exception. However, it is
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1 contract DaoChallenge {
2 function withdrawEtherOrThrow(uint256 amount) private {
3 bool result = msg.sender.call.value(amount)();
4 if (!result) {
5 throw;
6 }
7 }
8 ...
9 function refund() noEther {
10 address sender = msg.sender;
11 uint256 tokenBalance = tokenBalanceOf[sender];
12 if (tokenBalance == 0) { throw; }
13 tokenBalanceOf[sender] = 0;
14 withdrawEtherOrThrow(tokenBalance * tokenPrice);
15 notifyRefundToken(tokenBalance, sender);
16 }
17 }
Fig. 11. An example for non-exploitable reentrancy.
1 contract FunFairSale is Owned, TokenReceivable {
2 function withdraw() onlyOwner {
3 if (block.timestamp < deadline) throw;
4 if (!owner.call.value(this.balance) throw;
5 }
6 ...
7 }
Fig. 12. Another example for non-exploitable reentrancy.
reported as a vulnerability by both ContractFuzzer and Zeus. There is no easy
way to precisely detect exception disorder without semantic understandings.
Integer Overflow/Underflow. Integer overflow/underflow is an important
issue in smart contracts, as they may allow adversaries to steal Ether or tokens
from smart contracts. The 1,095 out of 1,523 smart contracts in the dataset used
by Zeus were reported as susceptible to integer overflow/underflow [36]. Although
many integer overflow/underflows may occur in theory, not all of them are practi-
cal. First, the total amount of Ether available on the Ethereum platform is limited
to 140 million Ether [40]. Therefore, one cannot use infinite amount of Ether
to overflow/underflow an uint256 variable. Second, the numbers of transactions
and participants are also much smaller than the upper bound of uint256. Finally,
many smart contracts use safe mathematics operations protected from over-
folw/underflow. This is not recognized by the property(pattern)-based techniques,
such as Zeus.
We take the code snippet from JamCoin (Fig. 14) as an example. In this
contract, before the integer operations at Lines 5 − 6, it checks whether the
operations would produce overflow/underflow at Lines 3 − 4. However, these
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1 contract Store {
2 function payout() returns (uint) {
3 uint amount = ownerBalances[msg.sender];
4 ownerBalances[msg.sender] = 0;
5 if (msg.sender.send(amount)) {
6 return amount;
7 } else {
8 ownerBalances[msg.sender] = amount;
9 return 0;
10 }
11 }
12 ...
13 }
Fig. 13. Non-exploitable exception disorder.
1 contract JamCoin {
2 function transfer(address _to, uint256 _value) {
3 if (balanceOf[msg.sender] < _value) throw;
4 if (balanceOf[_to] + _value < balanceOf[_to]) throw;
5 balanceOf[msg.sender] -= _value;
6 balanceOf[_to] += _value;
7 Transfer(msg.sender, _to, _value);
8 }
9 ...
10 }
Fig. 14. Non-exploitable integer overflow/underflow.
checks are ignored by Zeus [11]. It requires program contexts being considered to
accurately identify integer overflow/underflow.
5.6 Threats to validity
We have selected a benchmark set that is large enough to show the capabilities
of ContraMaster and compare it with other tools. However, both the set of
benchmarks we selected ours from, as well as our own selection, may include a
certain sample bias. Thus, the results may not generalize to all smart contracts.
Moreover, while our approach is generic and also applicable to other types of
smart contracts, some implementation details and issues found are specific to
Ethereum.
6 Related Work
Existing work on smart contract vulnerability detection can be categorized into
static analysis [7,6,9,10,11,41] and dynamic analysis [8,12].
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6.1 Static Analysis
Program Analysis. Securify [7] first infers semantic information by analyzing
control- and data-dependencies of the contract code. Then, it checks against
both the predefined compliance and violation properties to detect vulnerabilities.
SmartCheck [42] is an automated static code analyzer for smart contracts. It
automatically checks smart contracts against a knowledge base for security
vulnerabilities and bad practices. Slither [43] is a static analysis framework for
Solidity, which contains a suite of vulnerability detectors and also provides an
API for developing custom analyses.
Symbolic Execution. Oyente [9] is the first tool to apply symbolic execution in
finding potential vulnerabilities in smart contracts. It formulates the vulnerabili-
ties as intra-procedural properties, and uses symbolic execution to check against
these properties. TEETHER [22] focuses their analysis on the critical paths of
a contract program. Specifically, a path is critical if it includes an instruction
whose arguments can be controlled by an attacker. Once a critical path is found,
TEETHER computes the path conditions and infers the corresponding attack
sequences for triggering the vulnerability. In addition, TEETHER also requires
that the value transmitted in the final CALL instruction is greater than the sum
of all values sent to the contract. This is similar to our approach but imprecise,
because it does not model the whole transaction. MAIAN [10] is designed to find
three types of problematic contracts: the prodigal, greedy and suicidal contracts.
It formulates these three types of problems as inter-procedural properties, and
performs bounded inter-procedural symbolic execution to search for property
violations. EthRacer [31] investigates a family of event-ordering bugs in smart
contracts. These bugs are intimately related to the dynamic ordering of contract
events, i.e., function calls. The technical challenge in detecting event-ordering
bugs in smart contract is the inherent combinatorial blowup in the path and
state space analysis, even for simple contracts. The authors propose to use
partial-order reduction techniques, using automatically extracted happens-before
relations along with several dynamic symbolic execution optimizations.
Formal Verification. There are also attempts to formally verify smart contracts
using either model checking or theorem-proving [29,11,44,45,46,41,47,48,49,50].
Zeus [11] first translates Solidity source code into LLVM [51] intermediate lan-
guage, and then performs the verification with the SeaHorn verification frame-
work [52]. Hirai [44] defines a formal semantic model for EVM using the Lem
language, and proves safety properties of contract programs compiled to Lem,
with the interactive theorem prover Isabelle/HOL. KEVM [45] is a semantic
encoding of EVM bytecode in the K-framework based on the rewriting logic.
VerX [48] is an automated verifier for proving functional properties of smart
contracts. VerX addresses an important problem, as all real-world contracts
must satisfy custom functional specifications. VerX combines three techniques,
enabling it to automatically verify temporal properties of infinite state smart
contracts: (1) reduction of temporal property verification to reachability checking,
(2) a new symbolic execution engine for EVM that is precise and efficient for
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a practical fragment of smart contracts, and (3) delayed predicate abstraction
which uses symbolic execution during transactions and abstraction at transaction
boundaries. VERISOL [53] studies the safety and security of smart contracts in
the Azure Blockchain Workbench, an enterprise Blockchain-as-a-Service offer-
ing from Microsoft. It formalizes the semantic conformance of smart contracts
against a state machine model with access-control policies, and develops a highly-
automated formal verifier for Solidity that can produce proofs as well as discover
counterexamples.
Static analysis approaches can be more efficient in terms of running time,
but they often suffer from high false-positive rate. The main difference between
our approach and these techniques is that, our approach dynamically executes
the contract code on the real EVM environment, and therefore the detected
vulnerabilities are guaranteed to be exploitable.
6.2 Dynamic Analysis
Some dynamic analysis techniques are proposed to stress the vulnerabilities of
smart contracts [54,55].
Input generation. ContractFuzzer [8] is a fuzzing framework for detecting
vulnerabilities of Ethereum smart contracts. It proposes seven specific patterns
for seven types of vulnerabilities. Based on these patterns, it generates fuzzing
inputs, instruments the EVM to collect the execution traces, and analyzes
the traces to identify vulnerabilities. ReGuard [12] developed a fuzzing-based
analyzer to automatically detect reentrancy vulnerabilities. Specially, it performs
fuzz testing on smart contracts by iteratively generating random but diverse
transactions. Based on the runtime traces, ReGuard dynamically identifies the
reentrancy vulnerabilities. Echidna [56] takes a contract program as well as a
set of invariants as input, and generates random inputs to trigger potential
vulnerabilities. The invariants used by Echidna have to be written within the
contract itself, thus they are not expressive enough to encode our inter-contract
invariants. Wstholz and Christakis [57] present a technique that extends greybox
fuzzing with a method for learning new inputs based on already explored smart
contract executions. The learned inputs can be used to guide exploration towards
specific executions, for instance, ones that increase path coverage.
The main difference between our approach and other dynamic approaches is
that we provide general principles that drill down to the very root of vulnerabilities,
while other approaches use generic properties to detect specific vulnerabilities. By
definition, fixed collections of properties are limited and modeled at the syntactic
level; thus, they usually suffer from both false negatives and false positives. We
believe that the absence of a general and precise test oracle is the main reason
that there exist very few dynamic techniques for detecting vulnerabilities in smart
contracts.
Test oracle. The lack of a precise test oracle is often the main bottleneck in
software test automation [58]. An empirical analysis of model-derived test cases
for Java programs shows that using a test oracle roughly doubles the defect
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detection rate [59]. Most activities to support the test oracle focus on providing
better specification mechanisms, or on mining properties from the documentation
or comments [58]. An implicit test oracle covers assumptions that have to hold
globally for well-defined applications, e.g., no memory access to unallocated or
uninitialized memory should ever happen. Sereum [60] protects the deployed
smart contracts from being exploited. It addresses this problem in the context of
re-entrancy exploits and propose a novel smart contract security technology, which
protects existing, deployed contracts against re-entrancy attacks in a backwards
compatible way based on run-time monitoring and validation. Sereum does not
require any modification to or any semantic knowledge of existing contracts. Our
work is also within that domain, as we cover the implicit assumption that no
funds are created or destroyed by transactions. We therefore provide a valuable
contribution in a field where it is in general very difficult to find useful implicit
assumptions [58].
In general, specifications are provided by developers, either on a case-by-case
based in code, or as more general rules that apply throughout the program.
Specifications can be provided as executable code in the form of software design
requirement, as preconditions, invariants, and postconditions [61]. These facilities
have been made available in the Solidity language as of version 0.4.10 [62,63],
but are not widely used yet. Compared to verification on traditional platforms,
these features on Solidity have the drawback that their usage incurs side effects
(in terms of the gas cost of computing the expression being evaluated); in general,
side effects should be avoided in such expressions [64].
7 Conclusion
We propose ContraMaster, a grey-box fuzzing approach for finding exploitable
vulnerabilities in smart contracts. Different from previous works, the proposed
test oracle captures the very roots of transaction-related vulnerabilities based
on invariants (Definitions 3 and 4), which are essential and not specific to any
particular attack pattern. We also use feedback computed from the efficient
runtime monitoring on EVM to guide the mutation of transaction sequences
for fuzzing. We have demonstrated that ContraMaster is effective in finding
exploitable vulnerabilities and produces much fewer false positives than the
state-of-the-art. Furthermore, we find and confirm three new attacks.
References
1. “Bitcoin Project,” https://bitcoin.org/, 2019.
2. “Ethereum Project,” https://www.ethereum.org/, 2019.
3. G. W. Peters and E. Panayi, “Understanding Modern Banking Ledgers Through
Blockchain Technologies: Future of Transaction Processing and Smart Contracts
on the Internet of Money,” in Banking Beyond Banks and Money. Springer, 2016,
pp. 239–278.
28 Haijun Wang, Yi Li, Shang-Wei Lin, Cyrille Artho, Lei Ma, and Yang Liu
4. R. Xu, L. Zhang, H. Zhao, and Y. Peng, “Design of Network Media’s Digital
Rights Management Scheme Based on Blockchain Technology,” in International
Symposium on Autonomous Decentralized System. IEEE, 2017, pp. 128–133.
5. M. Iansiti and K. R. Lakhani, “The Truth about Blockchain,” Harvard Business
Review, 2017.
6. J. Chang, B. Gao, H. Xiao, J. Sun, and Z. Yang, “sCompile: Critical Path Iden-
tification and Analysis for Smart Contracts,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1808.00624,
2018.
7. P. Tsankov, A. Dan, D. D. Cohen, A. Gervais, F. Buenzli, and M. Vechev, “Securify:
Practical Security Analysis of Smart Contracts,” in ACM Conference on Computer
and Communications Security, 2018, pp. 67–82.
8. B. Jiang, Y. Liu, and W. Chan, “ContractFuzzer: Fuzzing Smart Contracts for
Vulnerability Detection,” in Proceedings of the 33rd ACM/IEEE International
Conference on Automated Software Engineering. ACM, 2018, pp. 259–269.
9. L. Luu, D.-H. Chu, H. Olickel, P. Saxena, and A. Hobor, “Making Smart Contracts
Smarter,” in ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security. ACM,
2016, pp. 254–269.
10. I. Nikolic, A. Kolluri, I. Sergey, P. Saxena, and A. Hobor, “Finding the Greedy,
Prodigal, and Suicidal Contracts at Scale,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1802.06038, 2018.
11. S. Kalra, S. Goel, M. Dhawan, and S. Sharma, “Zeus: Analyzing Safety of Smart
Contracts,” in The Network and Distributed System Security Symposium, 2018.
12. C. Liu, H. Liu, Z. Cao, Z. Chen, B. Chen, and B. Roscoe, “ReGuard: finding
reentrancy bugs in smart contracts,” in ACM/IEEE International Conference on
Software Engineering. ACM, 2018, pp. 65–68.
13. “DaoChallenge Source,” https://etherscan.io/address/
0x80f1f62b8b365c5326100d462d8570771b8d0e57, 2019, accessed 2019.
14. Y. Feng, E. Torlak, and R. Bod´ık, “Precise Attack Synthesis for Smart Contracts,”
arXiv preprint arXiv:1902.06067, vol. abs/1902.06067, 2019.
15. M. Zalewski, “American Fuzzy Lop,” http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/, 2016.
16. N. Grech, M. Kong, A. Jurisevic, L. Brent, B. Scholz, and Y. Smaragdakis, “Madmax:
Surviving Out-of-Gas Conditions in Ethereum Smart Contracts,” Proceedings of
the ACM on Programming Languages, p. 116, 2018.
17. M. Jakobsson and A. Juels, “Proofs of Work and Bread Pudding Protocols,” in
Secure Information Networks. Springer, 1999, pp. 258–272.
18. S. King and S. Nadal, “PPCoin: Peer-to-Peer Crypto-Currency with Proof-of-Stake,”
https://bitcoin.peryaudo.org/vendor/peercoin-paper.pdf.
19. S. Wu, Y. Chen, Q. Wang, M. Li, C. Wang, and X. Luo, “CReam: A Smart Con-
tract Enabled Collusion-Resistant E-Auction,” IEEE Transactions on Information
Forensics and Security, vol. 14, no. 7, pp. 1687–1701, 2018.
20. “Solidity,” https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/v0.5.1/, 2018.
21. J. Jiao, S. Kan, S.-W. Lin, D. Sanan, Y. Liu, and J. Sun, “Executable Operational
Semantics of Solidity,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1804.01295, 2018.
22. J. Krupp and C. Rossow, “teEther: Gnawing at Ethereum to Automatically Exploit
Smart Contracts,” in 27th USENIX Security Symposium USENIX Security. ACM,
2018, pp. 1317–1333.
23. “ERC-20,” https://theethereum.wiki/w/index.php/ERC20 Token Standard/, 2018.
24. “ERC-721,” http://erc721.org/, 2019.
25. K. Chatterjee, A. K. Goharshady, and Y. Velner, “Quantitative Analysis of Smart
Contracts,” in European Symposium on Programming. Springer, 2017, pp. 494–509.
Oracle-Supported Dynamic Exploit Generation for Smart Contracts 29
26. N. Atzei, M. Bartoletti, and T. Cimoli, “A Survey of Attacks on Ethereum Smart
Contracts,” in Principles of Security and Trust. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer, 2017,
pp. 164–186.
27. H. Wang, Y. Li, S.-W. Lin, L. Ma, and Y. Liu, “Vultron: Catching Vulnerable Smart
Contracts Once and for All,” in Proceedings of the 41st International Conference
on Software Engineering: New Ideas and Emerging Results. IEEE Press, 2019, pp.
1–4.
28. “Decentralized Application Security Project (or DASP) Top 10 of 2018,” http:
//www.dasp.co/, 2018, accessed 2018.
29. E. M. Clarke Jr, O. Grumberg, D. Kroening, D. Peled, and H. Veith, Model Checking.
MIT press, 2018.
30. Y. Li, B. Chen, M. Chandramohan, S.-W. Lin, Y. Liu, and A. Tiu, “Steelix: Program-
State Based Binary Fuzzing,” in Proceedings of the 2017 11th Joint Meeting on
Foundations of Software Engineering. ACM, 2017, pp. 627–637.
31. A. Kolluri, I. Nikolic, I. Sergey, A. Hobor, and P. Saxena, “Exploiting the Laws of
Order in Smart Contracts,” in Proceedings of the 28th ACM SIGSOFT International
Symposium on Software Testing and Analysis. ACM, 2019, pp. 363–373.
32. S. Rawat, V. Jain, A. Kumar, L. Cojocar, C. Giuffrida, and H. Bos, “VUzzer:
Application-aware Evolutionary Fuzzing,” in The Network and Distributed System
Security Symposium, vol. 17, 2017, pp. 1–14.
33. G. Wood, “Ethereum: A Secure Decentralised Generalised Transaction Ledger.
Ethereum Project Yellow Paper (2018),” 2018.
34. H. Wang, T. Liu, X. Guan, C. Shen, Q. Zheng, and Z. Yang, “Dependence Guided
Symbolic Execution,” IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering, vol. 43, no. 3,
pp. 252–271, 2017.
35. J. Ferrante, K. J. Ottenstein, and J. D. Warren, “The Program Dependence Graph
and Its Use in Optimization,” ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and
Systems, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 319–349, Jul. 1987.
36. Yoichi Hirai, “Integer Overflow/Underflow,” https://github.com/ethereum/solidity/
issues/796#issuecomment-253578925, 2016, accessed 2019.
37. G. Klees, A. Ruef, B. Cooper, S. Wei, and M. Hicks, “Evaluating Fuzz Testing,” in
Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communica-
tions Security. ACM, 2018, pp. 2123–2138.
38. NCC Group, “DASP: Decentralized Application Security Project,” https://www.
dasp.co/, 2019.
39. Sjors Provoost, “Dao Challenge,” https://medium.com/@dao.challenge/challenge-
3-how-i-almost-lost-100-1a11a9824ccb, 2016, accessed 2019.
40. Vitalik Buterin, “Ether Total Supply,” https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/issues/
960, 2018, accessed 2019.
41. K. Bhargavan, A. Delignat-Lavaud, and e. a. Fournet, “Formal Verification of
Smart Contracts: Short Paper,” in Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Workshop on
Programming Languages and Analysis for Security. ACM, 2016, pp. 91–96.
42. “smartCheck,” https://tool.smartdec.net/, 2019.
43. Trail of Bits, “Slither,” https://github.com/trailofbits/slither, 2019, accessed 2019.
44. Y. Hirai, “Defining the Ethereum Virtual Machine for Interactive Theorem Provers,”
in International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security. Springer,
2017, pp. 520–535.
45. E. Hildenbrandt, M. Saxena, N. Rodrigues, X. Zhu, P. Daian, D. Guth, B. Moore,
D. Park, Y. Zhang, A. Stefanescu, and G. Rosu, “KEVM: A Complete Formal
Semantics of the Ethereum Virtual Machine,” in 2018 IEEE 31st Computer Security
Foundations Symposium. IEEE, 2018, pp. 204–217.
30 Haijun Wang, Yi Li, Shang-Wei Lin, Cyrille Artho, Lei Ma, and Yang Liu
46. FStarLang, “Fstartlang,” https://www.fstar-lang.org/, 2019, accessed 2019.
47. Why3, “Why3,” http://why3.lri.fr/, 2019, accessed 2019.
48. A. Permenev, D. Dimitrov, P. Tsankov, D. Drachsler-Cohen, and M. Vechev, “Verx:
Safety verification of smart contracts,” 2020.
49. D. Harz and W. Knottenbelt, “Towards safer smart contracts: A survey of languages
and verification methods,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1809.09805, 2018.
50. J. Liu and Z. Liu, “A Survey on Security Verification of Blockchain Smart Contracts,”
IEEE Access, 2019.
51. The LLVM Foundation, “LLVM,” https://llvm.org/, accessed 2019.
52. “SeaHorn,” http://seahorn.github.io/, 2019.
53. S. K. Lahiri, S. Chen, Y. Wang, and I. Dillig, “Formal Specification and Verification
of Smart Contracts for Azure Blockchain,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1812.08829, 2018.
54. P. Zheng, Z. Zheng, X. Luo, X. Chen, and X. Liu, “A Detailed and Real-Time
Performance Monitoring Framework for Blockchain Systems,” in 2018 IEEE/ACM
40th International Conference on Software Engineering: Software Engineering in
Practice Track (ICSE-SEIP). IEEE, 2018, pp. 134–143.
55. Y. Feng, E. Torlak, and R. Bodik, “Precise Attack Synthesis for Smart Contracts,”
arXiv preprint arXiv:1902.06067, 2019.
56. Trail of Bits, “Echidna,” https://github.com/trailofbits/echidna, 2019, accessed
2019.
57. V. Wu¨stholz and M. Christakis, “Learning Inputs in Greybox Fuzzing,” arXiv
preprint arXiv:1807.07875, 2018.
58. E. T. Barr, M. Harman, P. McMinn, M. Shahbaz, and S. Yoo, “The Oracle Problem
in Software Testing: A Survey,” IEEE transactions on software engineering, vol. 41,
no. 5, pp. 507–525, 2015.
59. N. Li and J. Offutt, “An Empirical Analysis of Test Oracle Strategies for Model-
Based Testing,” in IEEE Seventh International Conference on Software Testing,
Verification and Validation, March 2014, pp. 363–372.
60. M. Rodler, W. Li, G. O. Karame, and L. Davi, “Sereum: Protecting existing smart
contracts against re-entrancy attacks,” 2019.
61. B. Meyer, “Applying ‘Design by Contract’,” Computer, vol. 25, pp. 40–51, 1992.
62. “Smart Contract Security Best Practices,” https://github.com/ConsenSys/smart-
contract-best-practices, 2019, accessed 2019.
63. Ethereum, “Security Considerations,” https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/develop/
security-considerations.html, 2019, accessed 2019.
64. P. Fritzson, M. Auguston, and N. Shahmehri, “Using Assertions in Declarative and
Operational Models for Automated Debugging,” Journal of Systems and Software,
vol. 25, no. 3, pp. 223–239, 1994.
